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cases when the defendant's conduct was not intentionally decep-
tive. 7 Other alternatives may satisfy the deterrent goal of consumer
legislation with less strain on judicial resources. One such alter-
native is the imposition of a civil fine," to be imposed not merely, as
at present, for violation of an injunction, but upon a court's finding,
after adversarial hearing, that a defendant knowingly engaged in a
deceptive practice.
Adequate compensatory measures presently exist in the Unfair
Trade Practices Law, and deterrence could be strengthened by leg-
islative amendment. However, in the interest of discouraging decep-
tive conduct, the state supreme court, by allowing the Attorney
General to bring class actions, has fashioned an additional consumer
protection tool, albeit as yet a blunt one. It will be the task of the
lower courts to hone the instrument for effective use in specific
cases. Ultimately, the wisdom of the court's decision will depend
upon the way it is applied in future actions. Careful attention to the
facts of each case in light of the Stevens test will be essential if
class actions are to effectuate the consumer protection General
Motors seeks to promote.
Kelly Mangum
THE PROSECUTOR'S DILEMMA - A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
OR A DUTY NOT TO COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR
In a series of cases following the United States Supreme Court
decision of United States v. Agurs,' the Louisiana Supreme Court
has significantly altered its approach to the prosecutor's duty of
97. Obviously, deterrence is relevant only to intentional offenders, and the com-
mon law class actions which the appellate court had cited as precedent for allowing
class suits to be brought by the state for restitution all involved intentional violations
by defendants. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971); Kugler v. Koscot In-
terplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682 (1972); State v. Ralph Williams'
N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wash. 2d 298, 553 P.2d 423 (1976).
98. Section 1416 provides a maximum fine of $5000 per violation of any injunction
issued under sections 1407 or 1408. The Louisiana fine is lower than those in most
other jurisdictions, which generally are about $10,000. See Lovett, supra note 3, at 739
(discussion of civil penalties in a majority of states with a deceptive practice statute).
1. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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disclosure of exculpatory' material3 when faced with a specific re-
quest for that material.4 An analysis of the new direction taken by
the Louisiana Supreme Court regarding the defendant's right to ob-
tain specifically requested exculpatory evidence from the prosecu-
tion requires a thorough understanding of the landmark decision of
Agurs.
In Agurs, the prosecutor had failed to disclose prior conviction
records of the victim in the absence of a request. The Court held
that the defendant's due process right to a fair trail does require a
prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense in both a
general request and a no request situation.' In addition to recogniz-
2. Exculpatory evidence is commonly defined as that evidence which clears or
tends to clear one from alleged fault or guilt. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
the Court used the term "favorable" instead of "exculpatory." 373 U.S. at 87. In Giglio
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), the Court extended the definition to include
evidence affecting credibility. Generally, the term has been defined broadly and has
not been used to limit or define the prosecutor's duty to disclose. Rather, the require-
ment that the matter be "material" and the various tests of materiality set forth by
the Court have been used to limit and define this duty.
3. The prosecutor's constitutional duty of disclosure arises from the defendant's
due process right to a fair trial. In Agurs, the Court said:
We now consider whether the prosecutor has any constitutional duty to volunteer
exculpatory matter to the defense and if so, what standard of materiality gives
rise to that duty. . . .We are dealing with the defendant's right to a fair trial
mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
Our construction of that Clause will apply equally to the comparable Clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment applicable to trials in state courts.
427 U.S. at 107.
4. The United States Supreme Court had first recognized in Brady that the pro-
secution's suppression of specifically requested evidence favorable to an accused,
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment. In
the subsequent decision of Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972), the Court, discussing
the Brady decision and its meaning, stated:
The heart of the holding in Brady is [that] the prosecution's suppression of
evidence, in the face of a defense production request, [violates due process] where
the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or punish-
ment. Important, then, are (a) suppression by the prosecution after a request by
the defense, (b) the evidence's favorable character for the defense, and (c) the
materiality of the evidence.
Id at 794-95.
5. The Court in Agurs stressed that the prosecutor's duty to disclose generally
requested material will be the same as it is when there has been no request at all. In
describing the effect of a general request, the Court said that "[sluch a request really
gives the prosecutor no better notice than if no request is made." 427 U.S. at 106-07.
After some further discussion, the Court stated its conclusion as follows:
Whether we focus on the desirability of a precise definition of the prosecutor's
duty or on the potential harm to the defendant, we conclude that there is no
significant difference between cases in which there has been merely a general re-
quest for exculpatory matter and cases, like the one we must now decide, in
which there has been no request at all.
Id. at 107.
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ing the duty to disclose in both a general and no request situation
and defining the standard of materiality' by which that duty is to be
judged,' the Court in Agurs also reviewed the standard of materiali-
ty by which the prosecutor's duty to disclose specifically requested
exculpatory evidence is to be judged8 and, in expounding on the
nature of that duty, in dicta, seemingly expanded it.9 A closer ex-
amination of this apparent expansion of the prosecutor's duty to
disclose specifically requested exculpatory material may ap-
6. Not every nondisclosure by the prosecutor will result in a violation of defen-
dant's due process right to a fair trial. The nondisclosure will not result in constitu-
tional error unless the evidence is "material" in a constitutional sense. As the Court
said in Agurs:
On the other hand, since we have rejected the suggestion that the prosecutor has
a constitutional duty routinely to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, we can
not consistently treat every nondisclosure as though it were error. It necessarily
follows that the judge should not order a new trial every time he is unable to
characterize a nondisclosure as harmless under the customary harmless-error
standard .... Unless every nondisclosure is regarded as automatic error, the con-
stitutional standard of materiality must impose a higher burden on the defendant.
Id. at 111-12.
7. The standard is set forth as follows:
The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with
the justice of the finding of guilt. Such a finding is permissible only if sup-
ported by evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It
necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt
that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. This
means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire
record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the addi-
tional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. On the
other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional
evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 112-13.
8. The standard of materiality giving rise to the prosecutor's duty to disclose ex-
culpatory material in the presence of a specific request was discussed by the Agurs
Court as follows:
The second situation, illustrated by the Brady case itself, is character-
ized by a pre-trial request for specific evidence. . . . A fair analysis of the
holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the requirement of materiality is a
concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the
trial.
Id. at 104.
9. The notice function of the specific request was addressed by the Court:
Although there is, of course, no duty to provide defense counsel with
unlimited discovery of everything known by the prosecutor, if the subject
matter of such a request is material, or indeed if a substantial basis for
claiming materiality exists, it is reasonable to require the prosecutor to res-
pond either by furnishing the information or by submitting the problem to
the trial judge. When the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request,
the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.
Id at 106.
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propriately follow an in-depth analysis of the holding in Agurs,
regarding the prosecutor's duty to disclose in both a general and no
request situation.
The standard of materiality giving rise to the prosecutor's con-
stitutional duty to volunteer exculpatory evidence to the defense in
the general or no request situation is set forth in Agurs: "[I]f the
omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise
exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means that the
omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record.""0
In setting forth this standard of materiality, applicable in a
general or no request situation, the Court recognized that the pro-
blem of determining what, if anything, the prosecutor should volun-
tarily submit to defense counsel, arises in two principal contexts.
First, before and during the trial the prosecutor must decide what
must be voluntarily submitted to defense counsel. Secondly, after
trial, a judge must decide whether a non-disclosure deprived the
defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. The Court in Agurs
stressed that the duty to disclose is to be judged by the same stan-
dard of materiality in both of these contexts." The Court pointed
out that the test of materiality as used before trial will be retrospec-
tive in nature, because it requires that the evidence be "evaluated
in the context of the entire record"12 and the record is obviously in-
complete prior to trial. 3 The imposition of a retrospective pretrial
10. Id. at 112. See note 5, supra.
11. The Court stated:
The problem arises in two principal contexts. First, in advance of trial, and
perhaps during the course of a trial as well, the prosecutor must decide
what, if anything, he should voluntarily submit to defense counsel. Second,
after trial a judge may be required to decide whether a nondisclosure de-
prived the defendant of his right to due process. Logically the same standard
must apply at both times. For unless the omission deprived the defendant of
a fair trial, there was no constitutional violation requiring the verdict be set
aside; and absent a constitutional violation, there was no breach of the pro-
secutor's constitutional duty to disclose.
427 U.S. at 107-108.
12. See text at note 10, supra.
13. The Court stated:
Nevertheless, there is a significant and practical difference between the
pretrial decision of the prosecutor and the post-trial decision of the judge.
Because we are dealing with an inevitably imprecise standard, and because
the significance of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately un-
til the entire record is complete, the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful
questions in favor of disclosure. But to reiterate a critical point the pro-
secutor will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his
omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of a defendant's
right to a fair trial.
427 U.S. at 108 (emphasis added).
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standard of materiality, which requires an evaluation of the material
"in the context of the entire record," will hopefully force the pro-
secutor or trial judge to decide in favor of disclosure when in doubt,
rather than risk reversal when the entire record is complete and the
significance of the evidence can be properly evaluated.'4 A realiza-
tion that the Agurs "reasonable doubt" standard of materiality ap-
plies only in the general and no request situations and that the ap-
plication of this standard is the same both before and after trial is
essential to an understanding of the direction taken by the Loui-
siana Supreme Court. 5 Although the Court in Agurs refers to "the
significant and practical difference between the pretrial decision of
the prosecutor and the post-trial decision of the judge,"'" it is not in-
tended that different standards of materiality be employed before
and after trial. Rather, the variation arises solely because of the dif-
fering perspectives of the two parties: after trial the judge has the
benefit of the whole record to assist in determining materiality,
whereas at the pretrial stage the prosecutor has no record upon
which to rely.
In addition to fashioning a "reasonable doubt" standard and
determining how and when it is applied, the Agurs decision seem-
ingly expands the prosecutor's duty to disclose specifically re-
quested exculpatory material. Citing Brady v. Maryland7 for the
proposition that a prosecutor must disclose exculpatory evidence
when specifically requested*," the Agurs Court reviewed the stan-
dard of materiality which gives rise to that duty as follows: "implicit
in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed
evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial."'9 Therefore,
under the Brady standard of materiality, a prosecutor faced with a
specific request has a duty to disclose the requested material
whenever suppression might affect the outcome of the trial.
After reviewing the Brady standard of materiality, the Court in
Agurs arguably expanded the prosecutor's duty to disclose
specifically requested exculpatory evidence by further stating:
"[Indeed if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists, it is
reasonable to require the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing
14. See note 13, supra.
15. As will be more fully developed, the Louisiana Supreme Court has errone-
ously applied the Agurs "reasonable doubt" standard as a post-trial standard of
materiality to be used in evaluating the prosecutor's duty to disclose specifically re-
quested exculpatory evidence. See text at note 30-37, infra.
16. 427 U.S. at 108.
17. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
18. See note 4, supra.
19. 427 U.S. at 104.
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the information or by submitting the problem to the trial judge."2
Given the Brady standard of materiality applicable in a specific re-
quest situation and the statement in Agurs that a prosecutor faced
with a specific request must either disclose or submit the problem
to the trial judge whenever "a substantial basis for claiming
materiality exists," the Court in Agurs arguably imposed on the pro-
secutor a duty to disclose the requested material to the defense or
submit it to the court for an in camera inspection whenever there is
a substantial basis for claiming the suppressed material might affect
the outcome of the trial.'
Under the scheme set forth in Agurs, there are clearly two
separate standards of materiality which give rise to the prosecutor's
duty to disclose exculpatory material to the defense. The applicabili-
ty of a particular standard depends on the absence or presence of a
specific request. In a general or no request situation, the prosecutor
must volunteer exculpatory evidence to the defense whenever the
omission, when viewed in context of the entire record, would create
a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.2 In a specific re-
quest situation, the prosecutor has a duty to disclose exculpatory
material or submit the problem to the trial judge whenever a
substantial basis for claiming materiality exists. 2
The first post-Agurs Louisiana Supreme Court decision constru-
ing the prosecutor's duty to disclose specifically requested ex-
culpatory evidence was State v. May.24 In May, the defense counsel
specifically requested a letter allegedly authored by a co-indictee
containing statements exculpating the defendant. In reply to this
specific request, the state responded that it had no exculpatory
evidence. The supreme court quoted the language from Agurs re-
quiring the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing the informa-
20. Id. at 106. The Court did not delineate the circumstances in which "a substan-
tial basis for claiming materiality exists."
21. One question not yet resolved is what standard of materiality is to be used by
the trial judge, either before or during trial, when the prosecutor submits the re-
quested evidence for a determination of whether there is a duty to disclose. In Agurs,
the Court specifically instructed that the same standard be used both before and after
trial, in a general or no request situation. See note 11, supra. The standard of
materiality applicable in a specific request situation should likewise be the same both
before and after trial. That standard of materiality as defined in Agurs is satisfied
whenever "a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists," or put another way,
whenever there is a substantial basis for claiming the suppressed material might affect
the outcome of the trial.
22. See text at note 10, supra.
23. See note 21, supra, and accompanying text.
24. 339 So. 2d 764 (La. 1976).
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tion or by submitting the problem to the trial judge whenever "a sub-
stantial basis for claiming materiality exists." Construing this Agurs
standard, the court stated that if indeed there was such a letter as re-
quested by the defendant and it contained statements of the nature he
claimed, then at least, "a substantial basis for claiming materiality" ex-
isted. 5 Deeming the prosecutor's general response that it had no excul-
patory evidence insufficient in ascertaining whether a substantial basis
for claiming materiality did indeed exist, the court held that the trial
court erred in not requiring the prosecutor to respond to the
specific request of the defendant by indicating whether the state
had knowledge or possession of the letter. The court further in-
dicated that if the state did have knowledge or possession of the re-
quested letter, then there was at least a substantial basis for claim-
ing materiality; thus, the trial court erred by not requiring the pros-
ecutor to furnish the letter to the defendant or to submit it to the
court for a determination as to whether it constituted material to
which the defendant was entitled.
This part of the holding in May makes it clear that a prosecutor
faced with a specific request must declare whether the state has
knowledge or possession of the requested material; a general asser-
tion that it has no exculpatory evidence will be insufficient. By im-
posing such a duty on the prosecutor, the Louisiana Supreme Court
arguably has gone further than the Agurs decision requires. Under
the Agurs standard, a prosecutor faced with a specific request must
either turn the material over to the defendant or submit it to the
court for a determination of whether it constitutes material to which
defendant is entitled, only when there exists "a substantial basis for
claiming materiality."2
Under Agurs the prosecutor has the discretion to evaluate the
materiality of the requested matter and, upon a finding that a
substantial basis for claiming materiality does not exist, the pro-
secutor may simply reply that he has no exculpatory evidence which
he is bound to disclose. Because of the discretion given the pro-
secutor under the Agurs standard, a defendant denied disclosure of
specifically requested material has a double burden on appeal: he
must prove that the government actually had knowledge or posses-
sion of the requested material and that there exists "a substantial
basis for claiming materiality." In May, the court imposed a duty on
the prosecutor to respond to the specific request of the defendant
25. The court also mentioned admissibility as a factor to be considered in deter-
mining when a "substantial basis for claiming materiality exists." Id. at 770.
26. 427 U.S. at 106.
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by stating whether the state has knowledge or possession of the re-
quested material, regardless of whether "a substantial basis for
claiming materiality exists." It is submitted that this holding in May
is desirable, in that it gives both the trial and appellate courts a
means of reviewing any determination by the prosecutor that a
substantial basis for claiming materiality does not exist. 7
The prosecutor in May was faced with a specific request for ex-
culpatory evidence, so the court quite properly applied the "substan-
tial basis for claiming materiality" standard. As discussed earlier,28
this standard of materiality must be used both before trial by the
prosecutor and the trial judge, and after trial by the reviewing
judge. Before and during trial a prosecutor must disclose specifically
requested exculpatory evidence whenever there is a substantial
basis for claiming suppression might affect the outcome of the trial.
After trial, a reviewing judge must find constitutional error
whenever there is a substantial basis for claiming the suppressed
evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial and the pro-
secutor has either failed to disclose the requested material or the
trial court has erroneously failed to order disclosure. Thus, the due
process analysis in a specific request situation is not intended to be
different before and after trial. 9
To be consistent with the above scheme, the court in May, on re-
mand, should have instructed the trial court to grant a new trial
upon a finding that the state had knowledge or possession of the re-
quested material and that there was a substantial basis for claiming
the requested letter might have affected the outcome of the trial.
However, it did not do so. Instead, after applying the Agurs
"substantial basis for claiming materiality" standard to the actions
of the prosecutor and the trial judge before trial, the court stated
that the error perhaps was not reversible. Quoting from that
language in the Agurs decision which indicated that there is a
"significant and practical difference between the pretrial decision of
the prosecutor and the post-trial decision of the judge"3 as to the
prosecutor's duty to disclose in the general or no request situation,
the court adopted the Agurs "reasonable doubt" standard, ap-
plicable in a general or no request situation 1 as the standard of
reversibility or materiality to be applied post trial in a specific re-
27. The same standard of materiality should be applied both pretrial and post-trial
in a specific request situation, just as it is in a general or no request situation. See
note 21, supra, and accompanying text.
28. See note 21, supra, and accompanying text.
29. See note 21, supra, and accompanying text.
30. 427 U.S. at 108. For the proper meaning of this phrase, see note 13, supra.
31. See text at note 10, supra.
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quest situation.32 Thus, the court erroneously applied different stan-
dards of materiality, one pretrial and one post-trial, to determine
when suppression of specifically requested exculpatory material
violates due process.
Louisiana Supreme Court decisions subsequent to May have con-
tinued to apply the Agurs standard of materiality in a general or no
request situation as a post-trial standard of materiality in a specific
request situation. In State v. Falkins," unlike in May, the court had
the benefit of a complete record before it and there was no need to
remand for a determination as to whether the state had knowledge
or possession of the requested material. The court found that the
failure of the prosecutor to disclose that two of the state's
eyewitnesses had earlier misidentified one of the suspects, when the
defense had specifically requested of the prosecutor information as
to all prior identifications made by the state's witnesses, was error
in that a substantial basis for claiming materiality existed. However,
instead of reversing immediately upon this finding, the court revers-
ed only after applying the Agurs due process standard of materiali-
ty, which should be applied only in a general or no request
situation. 4
32. In the subsequent decision of State v. Falkins, 356 So. 2d 415 (La. 1978), the
court characterized the post-trial standard, applicable in a specific request, as follows:
In Agurs, the United States Supreme Court summarized the constitutional
test of reversibility because of non-disclosure in these terms ...... It
necessarily follows that [in a post-trial hearing by the Court] if the omitted
evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitu-
tional error has been committed. This means that the omission must be
evaluated in the context of the entire record.
Id. at 418 (citation omitted), quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-13.
The bracketed words, added to the Agurs quote by the Louisiana Supreme Court, il-
lustrate the erroneous interpretation of the Agurs decision. The court has taken the
Agurs standard of materiality, applicable in a general or no request situation, and ap-
plied it as a post-trial standard of reversibility in a specific request situation. Although
the Louisiana Supreme Court referred to this post-trial standard as a test of rever-
sibility, it must be construed as an application of a post-trial standard of materiality.
The standard of materiality being defined is a test to judge the prosecutor's duty to
disclose, which is a corollary to the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. If the
prosecutor has violated his constitutional duty to disclose, then the defendant's due
process right to a fair trial has been violated. If the defendant has been denied his due
process right to a fair trial, then he must be granted a new trial and any discussion of
reversibility or harmless error is inappropriate. Surely, it would be an exercise in con-
tradiction for a court to say that a defendant has been denied his due process right to
a fair trial and then to characterize the error as not reversible or harmless.
33. 356 So. 2d 415 (La. 1978).
34. In other words, the court applied the "reasonable doubt" standard. It stated:
In summary, however, the record discloses weaknesses and uncertainties in
the indentifications made by two of the state's five witnesses. Thus, the
misidentification by two others on the day of the robbery, if brought to the
1980]
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In the recent case of State v. Harvey,', the Louisiana Supreme
Court found error in the failure of the prosecutor to state whether
he had knowledge or possession of the requested prior conviction
records of prospective state witnesses. Accordingly, the case was
remanded for a determination as to whether the Agurs-Brady stan-
dard of materiality"6 had been violated. The supreme court in-
structed the trial judge to grant a new trial if this standard was
violated, and then only if the material suppressed by the state
would, upon its evaluation in the context of the entire record, create
a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. Consistent with
May and Falkins, the court in Harvey applied the Agurs standard of
materiality, which defines the prosecutor's duty to disclose in a
general or no request situation, as a standard of reversibility in a
specific request situation.
As discussed above,37 the Agurs decision does not contemplate
the application of two different standards of materiality, one pretrial
and one post-trial, in defining and reviewing the duty of a pro-
secutor to disclose specifically requested exculpatory evidence.
Federal courts of appeals decisions38 subsequent to Agurs have con-
sistently followed the constitutional scheme set forth in Agurs and
have employed the different standards of materiality (depending
upon whether there is a specific request situation or a general or no
request situation) in delineating the scope of the prosecutor's con-
stitutional duty of disclosure. 9 By adopting the constitutional stan-
dard of materiality applicable in a general or no request situation as
a standard of reversibility in a specific request situation, the Loui-
siana Supreme Court has placed an unconstitutionally harsh burden
attention of the trial jury, was sufficiently material as to have raised
reasonable doubt in the jury's mind, both as to the witness' own positive trial
identification and also as to the strength of the state's case (i.e., since the
identification of the accused by four out of five of the state's eyewitnesses is
shown to be open to doubt).
Upon this showing, the constitutional test for reversibility has been met;
for, as Agurs states, "the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that
did not otherwise exist."
Id. at 419, quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112.
35. 358 So. 2d 1224 (La. 1978).
36. This standard is whether there is a substantial basis for claiming the sup-
pressed evidence might affect the outcome of the trial. See note 21, supra, and accom-
panying text.
37. See text at notes 11-14, supra.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 579 F.2d 553, 559-60 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 569 (1978); Ostrer v. United States, 577 F.2d 782, 786 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1018 (1979); Garrison v. Maggio, 540 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 940 (1977); United States v. Jackson, 536 F.2d 628, 631 (5th Cir.
1976).
39. See text at notes 22-23, supra.
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on a defendant seeking a new trial based on the failure of the pro-
secutor to disclose specifically requested exculpatory evidence. It is
clearly more burdensome for a defendant to prove that the omitted
evidence might create a reasonable doubt which did not otherwise
exist than it is for him to prove that there was a substantial basis
for belief that the suppressed evidence might have affected the out-
come of the trial. 0
It is submitted that the Louisiana Supreme Court has erroneous-
ly applied the Agurs standard of materiality in a general or no re-
quest situation to situations where a specific request has been made.
40. Neither can the use of the Agurs reasonable doubt standard as a standard of
reversibility in a specific request situation be justified as an application of the federal
harmless error rule. The federal harmless error rule has been summarized as follows:
"The federal rule, then, allows a finding of harmless constitutional error only where
the reviewing court, after examining the entire record, finds the untainted evidence of
guilt so overwhelming . . . [that] the error complained of could not have affected the
result." Comment, Harmless Constitutional Error-A Louisiana Dilemma?, 33 LA. L.
REV. 82, 89 (1972). This standard focuses on both the sufficiency of the untainted
evidence and the error's possible effect on the jury in determining whether violation of
a federal constitutional right can ever be harmless error.
The standard of reversibility being employed by Louisiana courts focuses only on
the sufficiency of the untainted evidence and does not consider the possible effect of
the non-disclosure on the jury. See text at notes 28-30, supra. The Louisiana Constitu-
tion of 1974 limits the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court in criminal matters
to questions of law. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(c). This clause has been interpreted as pro-
hibiting the weighing of evidence by the supreme court. See, e.g., State v. Plumher,
281 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973); State v. Singleton, 252 La. 976, 215 So. 2d 512 (1968); State v.
Page, 251 La. 810, 206 So. 2d 503 (1968). This prohibition prompted the rejection of any
application of the federal harmless error rule in State v. Michelli, 301 So. 2d 577 (La.
1974), where the court said: "If we find a substantial violation of a constitutional or
statutory right, and if we then attempted to determine whether the error were
harmless, nothing could keep us from the prohibited task of evaluating the evidence."
307 So. 2d at 580 n.7.
The adoption in May, Falkins and Harvey of a standard of reversibility that would
grant a new trial only when the failure to disclose the requested material which,
"when viewed in the context of the entire record creates a reasonable doubt that did
not otherwise exist," requires the supreme court to review the sufficiency of the
evidence. The use of this standard of reversibility has the effect of usurping the func-
tion of the jury and is in violation of the Louisiana constitution. See LA. CONST. art. V,
§ 5(c). In State v. Moore, 305 So. 2d 532 (La. 1974), Justice Tate addressed the constitu-
tional duty of an appellate court as follows:
Under our time-honored principles of judicial review, it is the province of the
jury, not of an appellate court, to determine guilt or innocence on the basis
of properly admitted evidence. A court cannot deny a criminally accused his
constitutional rights because it and the prosecutor determine that the accus-
ed is guilty of the crime of which-before his guilt is determined by a jury
on the basis of constitutionally received evidence-he is merely accused. An
accused eventually convicted is as much entitled to the protection of the con-
stitutional guarantees of a fair trial as is one eventually acquitted.
305 So. 2d at 536 (emphasis in original).
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Under Agurs, the prosecutor should either disclose the requested
material or submit it to the trial court whenever there is a "substan-
tial basis for claiming the suppression of the evidence might affect
the outcome of the trial."'" The trial judge should order disclosure of
the specifically requested material, before or during trial, under the
same circumstances. After trial the proper standard to evaluate
whether a defendant's due process right to a fair trail has been
violated by the failure of the prosecutor to disclose specifically re-
quested exculpatory evidence is also whether there was a substan-
tial basis for claiming that the suppressed material might have af-
fected the outcome of the trial. 2 If the reviewing court finds that
there was a substantial basis for claiming the suppressed material
might have affected the outcome of the trial, the defendant's due
process right to a fair trial has been violated and a new trial should
be ordered. It is urged that the Louisiana Supreme Court reject any
further application of the Agurs standard of materiality in a general
or no request situation to instances where the prosecutor is faced
with the specific request. Otherwise, it must risk the possibility of
reversal on collateral attack.
James P. Ryan
MAKING SENSE OF RANDOM VEHICLE STOPS AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HALTING ENIGMA
Defendant's automobile was subjected to a random driver's
license and vehicle registration check, following a stop that was
neither based on a traffic or equipment violation nor based on any
criminal activity by the defendant or the other occupants of the
vehicle. The patrolman effecting the stop arrested the defendant
after having observed marijuana on the floor of the automobile. The
Delaware state courts suppressed the marijuana as evidence on the
ground that it had been obtained during an illegal detention. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed and held' that, absent artic-
41. See note 21, supra, and accompanying text.
42. See note 21, supra, and accompanying text.
1. An additional issue raised was the Court's lack of jurisdiction over the case, as
the Delaware Supreme Court had based its decision on independent and adequate
state grounds. The Court disposed of this issue by concluding that "the Delaware
Supreme Court did not intend to rest its decision independently on the state constitu-
tion and that we have jurisdiction of this case." Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391,
1395 (1979). Compare DEL. CONST. art. I, § 6, with LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (the right to
privacy guarantee).
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